What if the Ministry of Defence could defeat a claim of race discrimination by insisting that the person you should be compared with must have the same national origins as you?
Think about that for a moment.
You say that the state treated you differently because of where you came from.
The state replies that, for the purposes of deciding whether you were treated differently, you should be compared with somebody who came from the same place.
And then, if both of you would have been treated identically, where is the discrimination?
It is an ingenious argument.
It is also the kind of argument that makes me wonder whether the law is sometimes in danger of becoming so absorbed in its own machinery that it forgets what the machinery was built to protect.
This is not a hypothetical question from a law-school examination.
It is a dispute arising in my Equality Act proceedings against the Ministry of Defence.
And the place in question is Leningrad.
The city where I was born.
The fact I cannot change
I was born in Soviet Leningrad in 1976.
Since then, the country of my birth has disappeared. The city has changed its name. I have lived in Poland and Britain, acquired different citizenships and built my professional life as a British solicitor.
I have spent most of my adult life in countries other than the one in which I was born.
But I cannot change my birthplace.
Nor should I have to.
For most of my life, it was simply a biographical fact. Something written on forms, passports and professional records.
Then I entered a relationship with a Spanish naval officer serving at NATO's Maritime
Command at Northwood.
And somehow, the place where I was born acquired a significance I had never given it.
In October 2025, I discovered that the Ministry of Defence had imposed a personal restriction on my access to Northwood Headquarters.
I had not been notified of the decision, according to my case. I had not been given an explanation that I could meaningfully challenge.
I was not a member of the armed forces. I held no security clearance. I had no independent entitlement to enter a military installation, and I have never claimed otherwise.
But there is an important difference between not being entitled to enter somewhere and being personally identified as someone who must not be permitted entry, even under ordinary escorted visitor arrangements.
That difference matters.
Especially when the authority imposing the restriction acknowledges that race was a factor in its decision.
The admission that changed the question
In its Defence, the Ministry of Defence acknowledges that my race was a factor in the decision that I should not be permitted access.
It also describes my birthplace as the key factor in the security investigation concerning my partner, a Spanish Commander serving at MARCOM.
These statements concern related but distinct decisions. They do not establish every step in the chain of events, or prove that any individual acted with an improper motive.
The Ministry maintains that its actions served national security.
I challenge that explanation and have advanced allegations concerning the purposes for which security processes were used. Those allegations remain disputed.
But even before a court determines the ultimate justification for the restriction, there is a question worth examining.
What happens when the government acknowledges that race was relevant to an adverse decision, then proposes a legal comparison that incorporates the very origin-related circumstances being challenged?
That is where the story becomes particularly strange.
The woman from Manchester
The Equality Act 2010 prohibits direct race discrimination, subject to the applicable statutory provisions.
Race includes colour, nationality and ethnic or national origins. Place of birth is not itself a separately listed protected characteristic, but it may be relevant evidence of national origins or perceived national origin.
Section 13 concerns less favourable treatment because of a protected characteristic.
Section 23 addresses the comparison of circumstances.
In ordinary language, the court may need to ask a deceptively simple question:
Would the authority have treated someone differently if she had been of different national origins, but otherwise in materially comparable circumstances?
In my Particulars of Claim, I proposed a hypothetical comparator.
A British woman born in Manchester.
She would be in a comparable relationship with an officer serving at MARCOM. She would have no independent access entitlement, just as I had none. She would be subject to the same ordinary visitor rules.
Would the Ministry have imposed the same personal restriction on her?
That is the question I want answered.
The Ministry proposes a different comparison.
Its comparator is another civilian born in Russia, whose birthplace also featured in the security investigation concerning her partner.
Read that again.
The Ministry's proposed comparator retains both the Russian birthplace and the relevance attributed to it in the investigation.
And this is the point at which my professional interest as a lawyer begins to collide with something much more personal.
Because if the very feature I say was improperly used against me is treated as a necessary condition of the comparison, how does the comparison test whether that feature caused the treatment?
It risks answering a different question altogether.
Not whether national origin made a difference.
But whether the Ministry would treat two people identically after assigning the same significance to their origins.
Those are not necessarily the same thing.
When the test contains the alleged discrimination
Imagine a public authority introduces a rule that disadvantages people because of a protected characteristic.
A person challenges the rule.
The authority then argues that the correct comparator must also possess that characteristic and satisfy the disputed condition.
Both individuals would be treated alike.
The authority points to their identical treatment.
No difference. No discrimination.
But the comparison may have concealed the distinction that mattered.
This is the danger of circular reasoning.
The criterion being challenged is carried into the comparator's circumstances, where it can become an apparently neutral explanation for the outcome.
English discrimination law has confronted analogous problems before.
In James v Eastleigh Borough Council [1990] 2 AC 751, free swimming was offered to people who had reached statutory pensionable age. At the time, women reached that age earlier than men.
The policy was expressed by reference to pensionable age rather than expressly by sex.
But that condition itself incorporated a sex-based distinction.
The courts did not permit the structure of the condition to obscure the discriminatory treatment.
My case is factually different. It concerns national origins, access restrictions and an asserted national-security justification.
The analogy does not decide my claim.
It illustrates why courts must examine carefully whether an apparently relevant condition is genuinely independent of the protected characteristic, or whether it carries the alleged discrimination into the comparison.
The same caution is relevant here.
An independently established security concern can be a material circumstance. The law does not require courts to disregard genuine differences in security risk.
But where the significance attributed to someone's origins is itself disputed, the authority cannot simply assume that significance is legally neutral.
That is what must be examined.
And it is why I find the Ministry's position so troubling.
When defending a decision becomes defending the criterion
I understand that government departments defend litigation.
They are entitled to dispute allegations, challenge legal arguments and rely upon statutory defences.
The Ministry of Defence is no exception.
I also understand that national security can require restrictions that would be inappropriate in ordinary civilian settings.
But there is something profoundly uncomfortable about an authority defending an origin-related decision by asking the court to accept an origin-related premise as part of the comparison.
The danger is not merely that the claimant might lose.
People lose discrimination cases for perfectly legitimate reasons.
The danger is that the court could be invited to treat the disputed criterion as part of the unquestioned factual background.
If that happens, the legal analysis risks protecting the decision from precisely the scrutiny the Equality Act was designed to provide.
This is what I mean when I say the defect could become crystallised.
A factual assumption becomes part of a legal comparison.
The comparison becomes part of the reasoning.
And the reasoning may then be used to explain why the original treatment was not discriminatory.
I regard that prospect as deeply troubling.
I also find the persistence of this position exhausting.
Not because the Ministry has no right to defend itself, but because the dispute concerns something so fundamental: whether the circumstances used to explain an adverse decision can themselves be examined for discrimination.
There is a difference between robustly defending a decision and advancing a defence that, if accepted without careful scrutiny, could empty an important statutory protection of practical meaning.
I consider the latter approach oppressive in its effect.
Whether any litigation conduct is legally vexatious or abusive is a separate question, and not one established merely because I regard an argument as circular or objectionable.
But the human consequence of defending such a claim should not disappear behind procedural language.
I am being required to litigate not only what the Ministry did, but how the law is permitted to ask whether it was discriminatory.
National security is not a substitute for reasoning
The Ministry also relies upon national security.
Section 192 of the Equality Act provides a statutory exception where the relevant conduct is done for the purpose of safeguarding national security and is proportionate to that purpose.
That provision matters.
National security is a legitimate and serious responsibility of the state.
But the existence of the exception does not eliminate the need to examine whether its conditions are satisfied.
The questions are practical.
What risk was identified?
What information supported that assessment at the time?
Why did the response require a restriction against me personally?
Why was the restriction framed as it was?
How long was it intended to last?
And what made its scope proportionate?
Those questions should be answered through evidence, subject to any lawful protections for genuinely sensitive information.
They should not be answered merely by repeating the words national security.
Nor should the statutory justification be confused with the separate question of whether discrimination occurred.
The court may ultimately find that the Ministry's actions were lawful.
It may find that a particular comparison is appropriate.
It may accept the national-security justification.
Those are matters for judicial determination.
But they should be determined by examining the relevant distinctions, not by assuming away the very issue in dispute.
A person cannot choose where she was born
There is another dimension to all this.
One that no legal pleading can adequately capture.
I did not choose to be born in Leningrad.
I did not choose the Soviet Union, its government or its intelligence services.
I was a child.
I subsequently made choices about where to live, what citizenship to hold, what profession to pursue and what principles to defend.
Those choices are mine.
My birthplace is not.
Yet in the documents surrounding this dispute, that immutable fact has acquired a significance that has followed me into my private life, my relationship and now a British courtroom.
I have had to read official arguments about why the place where I was born mattered to decisions about me.
I have had to examine whether that fact was treated as an indicator of something more sinister.
And I have had to confront a proposed legal comparison in which the person against whom my treatment is measured is also required to have been born in Russia.
There is an almost unbearable irony in that.
I spent years becoming the person I am.
A British citizen. A solicitor. A mother. An independent woman.
And yet the fact I cannot change is the fact around which this legal argument turns.
I do not want special treatment because of my history.
I want the ordinary protection of the law.
The same protection that should be available to anyone whose national origins may have influenced a decision made by a public authority.
The question beyond my case
This is why I am writing about the comparator dispute outside the courtroom.
Not to ask the public to decide my claim.
Not to pressure the Ministry into settlement.
And not to suggest that a disputed legal argument proves bad faith.
I am writing because the issue has consequences far beyond one woman and one military headquarters.
Public authorities routinely make decisions involving nationality, birthplace, immigration history, family connections and perceived security risks.
Sometimes those facts are genuinely relevant.
Sometimes they are not.
Sometimes the difficulty lies not in collecting the information but in the meaning an institution assigns to it.
And sometimes that meaning is precisely what the law must test.
If an authority can make the disputed significance of a protected characteristic a defining condition of the comparator, there is a risk that discrimination becomes harder to identify precisely because the criterion has been incorporated into the test.
That is a public-interest problem.
The Equality Act was not enacted to protect only people whose circumstances are administratively convenient to compare.
It exists, in part, because distinctions that appear natural or inevitable to an institution may be the very distinctions that require legal scrutiny.
I do not know how the court will determine my case.
But I know what question I want it to confront.
Not whether another woman born in Russia would have been treated as I was.
But whether the Ministry would have treated a woman of different national origins, in materially comparable circumstances, in the same way — and, if not, whether the law justified the difference.
Because the place where I was born is a fact.
What the state decided that fact meant is a decision.
And a decision made by the state must remain open to examination.
That is the difference between having a birthplace and being judged by it.
And it is a difference I intend to defend.
Invisible Woman is a book in the making and a live blog exploring the intersection of private life, institutional power, law and accountability. The proceedings discussed here remain ongoing. The views expressed are my own; disputed allegations are not findings of fact.
Legal references: Equality Act 2010, sections 9, 13, 23 and 192; James v Eastleigh Borough Council [1990] 2 AC 751; Shamoon v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [2003] UKHL 11; Cornerstone (North East) Adoption and Fostering Service Ltd v Ofsted [2021] EWCA Civ 1390.