I have always enjoyed a spy thriller. Until I watched "Red sparrow". But a good thriller is still good. That is why sometimes we need to step into a pile of shit, so we appreciate the quality.

So, good spy thriller.

Secret operations. Classified documents. Mysterious disappearances. Men in uniform. A beautiful woman suspected of being a Russian spy.

You know the genre.

James Bond had a licence to kill.

Apparently, NATO has on as well.

A licence to kill complaints.

Not literally, of course.

That would require an investigation.

And investigations, as I have discovered, are rather complicated things. As they are required to investigate the investigators.

Over the past few days, I have been examining twelve months of my correspondence with NATO. Not because I particularly enjoy reading data-protection policies — although, as a solicitor, I have developed a worrying tolerance for such activities.

I wanted to understand something.

What happens to a complaint once it enters one of the world's most sophisticated military organisations?

The answer depends, apparently, on what the complaint is about.

Ask for personal data, and NATO knows exactly how to respond.

There are acknowledgements. Reference numbers. Procedural extensions. Policies. Restrictions. Decisions. Appeals.

A magnificent administrative apparatus. To make your DSR go nowhere. But still a good design.

But ask NATO to investigate allegations concerning the sexualised treatment of a civilian woman, or possible interference with intimate communications, and the documentary trail becomes considerably more mysterious.

So I decided to conduct a little forensic exercise.

Not a murder investigation.

A complaint investigation.

Welcome to NATO: Licence to Kill.

CASE FILE 001: DEATH BY STRAGULATION

Victim: My first Data Subject Request.
Date of birth: 12 February 2026.
Cause of death: Investigation and deliberative-proceedings restrictions.
Body recovered: Yes. A formal refusal was issued.

In February, I asked NATO for information about personal data concerning me.

Nothing particularly exotic.

Metadata. Restrictions. Sources. Recipients. The movement of information between authorities.
I wanted to know what NATO knew about me, how it knew it and where the information had traveled. At the end, thanks to my British state, I now know that there was apparently an investigation against me. It is a bit of Schrödinger’s Investigation, as officially nobody told me that I was ever investigated, but there is still that inconvenient piece of paperwork, where such expression was used. So I wanted to know and I asked the questions.

Apparently, those questions wandered into dangerous territory.

On 13 May 2026, the ACO Data Protection Officer refused the request on grounds connected with investigations and deliberative proceedings. No further details.

An elegant administrative manoeuvre.

I asked about the existence and movement of information.

NATO invoked restrictions concerning the processes in which information might be used.

Now, I am not suggesting that national security information must be disclosed merely because someone asks for it.

There may be perfectly legitimate reasons to withhold particular records.

But there is a difference between protecting sensitive information and declining to explain how a restriction applies to the particular information requested.

That distinction became one of the grounds of my subsequent appeal.

The February request was not lost.

It was not ignored.

It was formally strangled.

A clean administrative death.

Official classification: Killed by strangulation.

CASE FILE 002: DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS

Victim: My second Data Subject Request.
Date of birth: 13 March 2026.
Cause of death: General explanations, disputed search adequacy and unresolved record-specific questions.
Body recovered: Partially.

My second request concerned something even more dangerous than metadata.

Administrative records.

Visitor records. Access arrangements. Recruitment information. Complaints.

I wanted to know what had actually happened to information about me.

NATO responded on 11 June.

It explained categories of data processing. It referred to access arrangements and recruitment systems.

Very informative.

Except that explaining what a system generally does is not necessarily the same thing as explaining what happened to a particular person's records.

Imagine asking a hospital where your medical file has gone.

And receiving a detailed explanation of how filing cabinets work.

Technically interesting.

Not quite the answer.

The ACO Data Protection Board subsequently endorsed the earlier responses.

I appealed.

My objection was not that NATO had said nothing. It had said quite a lot.

My objection was that some of the most important record-specific questions remained unresolved.

Official classification: Death by procedural suffocation.

The paperwork survived.

The answers I wanted did not all emerge.

CASE FILE 003: THE COMPLAINT THAT DIED OF SUCCESS

Victim: My data-protection complaint.
Reference: ACO/DPO/DSR/FC/2026_06_15.
Date of death: 9 October 2026.
Cause: Not substantiated.
Body recovered: Yes. Complete with a decision.

Now this was a particularly impressive case.

My complaint entered the NATO administrative system and acquired a reference number.

A proper reference number.

With letters, numbers and underscores.

A small bureaucratic masterpiece.

On 9 October, the ACO Data Protection Board dismissed the complaint as not substantiated.
The Board provided some information, including retention statements and a reported search result concerning complaint logs.

It also endorsed earlier responses.

I disagreed with the adequacy of the determinations and appealed to NATO's Independent Decision-Making Authority on 26 October.

The appeal is not a claim that every question required its own decision or that every document had to be disclosed.

It asks whether the Board adequately addressed the material grounds actually raised.

Here is the delightful irony.

NATO's complaints machinery worked beautifully when the task was to reject a complaint about NATO's data-handling machinery.

The complaint was registered.
The complaint was considered.
The complaint was dismissed.
And I was told how to appeal.

That is not necessarily unlawful.

It is, however, a useful demonstration that the institution possesses the administrative capacity to process complaints when it chooses the appropriate route.

Which brings us to our next victims.

CASE FILE 004: THE RED SPARROW

Victim: My complaint about a reported sexualised nickname.
Date last seen: 20 September 2026.
Suspected cause of death: Administrative disappearance.
Body recovered: No identifiable substantive determination has been established in the correspondence I have reviewed.

In September 2026, Spanish newspaper El Español reported that NATO colleagues had referred to me as Gorrión Rojo — Red Sparrow.

For the uninitiated, Red Sparrow is a spy thriller associated with sexual manipulation and intelligence operations.

An interesting nickname for a British solicitor who happened to have been born in Russia.
I had already encountered suggestions that people considered me a Russian spy.

But this was something rather different.

A sexualised espionage characterisation, reportedly circulating in a professional military environment.

On 20 September, I asked NATO to investigate.

Who used the expression?
When?
In what circumstances?
Was it known to commanders?
Had anyone assessed whether it constituted harassment or discriminatory conduct?

I did not ask NATO to accept a newspaper report as proof.

I asked it to establish whether the reported conduct occurred.

A straightforward question for an organisation with extensive investigative and security capabilities.

Yet I have been unable to establish an equivalent administrative trail showing how that particular complaint was registered, allocated, assessed and determined.

Perhaps an investigation was opened.
Perhaps it was referred elsewhere.
Perhaps a decision exists.

I would welcome the relevant confirmation.

But until then, the case remains something of a mystery.

Official classification: No crime report as the body is not found.

Last seen entering NATO correspondence.
Present whereabouts unknown.

CASE FILE 005: FOR YOUR EYES ONLY

Victim: My investigation request concerning possible interference with intimate privacy.
Date last seen: 20 September 2026.
Suspected cause of death: Unexplained administrative handling.
Body recovered: No communicated investigation outcome identified.

This is where the story stops being merely amusing.

In August 2026, during a visit to Russia, someone showed me a video that I believed contained private intimate material involving my former partner and me.

I do not know the provenance of that material.
I do not know who obtained it.
I do not know whether it came from a private device, communications access or some entirely different source.

And I do not know whether anyone associated with NATO was involved.

Those are precisely the questions requiring investigation.

But there was a reason I reported the possibility of a connection.

Concerns about interference with my former partner's private communications had been raised with NATO in 2025.

On 12 July 2025, I contacted MARCOM's communications branch.

I followed up on 22 July.

On 25 July 2025, my former partner reported possible security and command irregularities to MARCOM Security, the NATO Office of Security and Rubén Picallo, requesting referral to Allied Command Counter-Intelligence.

He raised relevant concerns again in September 2025.

So when I encountered the video in August 2026, I was not inventing an entirely new concern.
I was asking whether the earlier warnings had been examined, whether evidence had been preserved and whether any possible connection could be established.

A proper investigation might find that NATO personnel had absolutely nothing to do with it.

That would be important.

A proper investigation might identify a different source.

That would also be important.

But without a traceable account of the handling of the reports, I cannot establish what was examined.

And here is the particularly absurd part.

NATO can restrict access to information on security grounds.

Yet when I raise a concern about possible unauthorised access to private information, I still have to ask what security assessment was undertaken.

Official classification: For Your Eyes Only — don't look for a dead body, if you do not want to become one.

The title would be funny if the subject were not so serious.

CASE FILE 006: THE TWO RECRUITMENT APPLICATIONS

Victims: Two applications for NATO positions.
Cause of death: Uncertain.
Last known location: NATO recruitment processing.
Body recovered: Not established from the general retention explanation.

There were also my two job applications.
Yes, I applied for positions with NATO.
A rather optimistic exercise, in retrospect.

But at the end, I did not know that if I am successful, I would be working with a bunch of sex perverts. I only found out about it after having been declared a Russian spy, which made my NATO employment chances possible only within a double-agency context.

My data-protection correspondence referred to TALEO recruitment processing.

The Board explained that data relating to non-shortlisted candidates were not retained after the relevant selection process.

A useful general statement.

But what happened to my applications?
Were they received?
Were they assessed?
Was I shortlisted?
What records were created?
Which records were retained?
Which, if any, were deleted under an applicable retention rule?

The general explanation did not establish the answers for my particular applications.

I am not claiming that somebody deliberately destroyed them.

I am saying that I could not reconstruct their individual administrative history from the information provided.

Official classification: Missing body.

And before anyone accuses me of overdramatising the matter, I should point out that the disappearance of an administrative trail is not proof of misconduct.

It is a reason to ask for the trail.

CASE FILE 007: THE COMPLAINT THAT REFUSED TO DIE

Victims: Our joint discrimination complaint and subsequent reports.
First report: 5 July 2025.
Cause of death: Still under investigation — by me.

Now let us introduce a witness.

My former partner, the Commander.

Spanish Navy.

Formerly assigned to NATO's Allied Maritime Command at Northwood.

And, rather inconveniently, someone who was inside the organisation when many of these events occurred.

On 5 July 2025, my former partner and I submitted a joint written complaint to Admiral Mike Utley, Commander Allied Maritime Command. He is now happily knighted and retired.

We alleged discriminatory treatment, social exclusion and hostility towards us as a couple.

The complaint referred to our exclusion from a MARCOM farewell dinner on 3 July.

It also raised much more serious allegations.

My former partner reported that between December 2024 and March 2025 superiors had repeatedly pressured him to end his relationship with me.

One reported incident concerned Captain David Fernández-Portal, who allegedly warned him that attending a Christmas event with me could have consequences.

Another concerned Admiral José Enrique Delgado Roig.

On 22 June 2025, my former partner met Admiral Delgado at the Three Crowns in Bushey.

The conversation concerned his relationship with me, my pregnancy, his access to Northwood and possible consequences for his posting or security clearance if he refuses to break up with me.

On 11 July 2025, MARCOM's Legal Adviser directed access questions to the United Kingdom and matters concerning Spanish military personnel to Spain.

A rather elegant jurisdictional manoeuvre.

The United Kingdom controls the base.

Spain deals with Spanish personnel.

And NATO?

Well, that is precisely the question.

Because the complaint also concerned the alleged conduct of people serving within the NATO environment.

On 12 July, I followed up on behalf of both of us, asking MARCOM to address those allegations.

My former partner subsequently made further reports concerning possible interference with private communications, sought administrative review and requested information about personal files on his NATO-issued laptop.

He is now asking MARCOM to reconstruct the handling of those representations.

Who received them?
Who assessed them?
Who decided whether an inquiry was required?
Who referred them?
And what happened next?

Official classification: Jurisdictional dismemberment.

One allegation.

Several possible authorities.

And a complainant left trying to establish which institution actually examined the conduct.

THE FORENSIC REPORT: SEVEN CASES, ONE QUESTION

By this stage, I had begun to notice a pattern.

Not proof of a conspiracy.

Not proof of deliberate destruction.

A pattern of different administrative outcomes.

Some complaints received formal refusals.

Some received decisions.

Some entered an appeal process.

Others left me unable to identify an equivalent account of registration, referral or determination.

And two recruitment applications remained insufficiently explained at the individual-record level.

The problem is not that every complaint must succeed.

The problem is that a person should be able to establish what happened to a complaint.

Even if the answer is no.
Especially if the answer is no.

An accountable organisation should be capable of saying:
We received it.
We examined it.
We referred it.
We rejected it.

We could not investigate it because the matter was outside our competence.

Or we investigated and found insufficient evidence.

Those are recognisable administrative outcomes.

What is not a satisfactory outcome is leaving the person affected unable to determine which of those things occurred.

THE WEAPON: A POLICY MANUAL

NATO has a policy on the prevention, management and combating of harassment, bullying and discrimination in the workplace.

Its reference is ON(2020)0057.

My former partner expressly invokes that policy in his formal complaint.

It addresses the conduct he alleges, including discrimination, exclusion, harassment and possible abuse of authority.

NATO also has a Personal Data Protection Framework Policy.

It has procedures for complaints.

It has review structures.

It has rules concerning information security.

It has rules concerning access.

And, apparently, enough procedural distinctions to keep a solicitor entertained for an entire winter.

But a policy does not investigate misconduct.

A policy does not preserve evidence.
A policy does not interview witnesses.
A policy does not decide whether a commander used professional authority improperly.
People do those things.

Or they do not.

And that is where institutional accountability begins.

Not with the number of policies an organisation publishes.

With the decisions it makes when someone reports behaviour that those policies are supposed to prevent.

THE PERFECT ALIBI: NATIONAL SECURITY

Of course, NATO is a security organisation.

I understand the need to protect classified information.

I understand that certain investigations and deliberations may be protected.

But national security cannot be treated as a universal answer to every question about institutional conduct.

It may justify withholding particular information.

It does not automatically demonstrate that a complaint was assessed.

It does not establish that personal data were accurate.

It does not establish that a reported security incident was investigated.

And it does not establish that an allegation of harassment was referred to the competent authority.

Indeed, if anyone improperly accessed private communications or circulated intimate material, that could itself raise a serious security concern.

So I find the logic rather extraordinary.

NATO can explain why information must be protected from me.

But I am still trying to establish what it did when I reported that private information might not have been protected from somebody else.

A licence to classify is not a licence to avoid accountability.

THE FINAL SCENE: NO TIME TO DIE

I have reached the end of my little forensic exercise.

There are seven case files.

Some contain formal refusals.

Some contain administrative decisions.

Others contain unresolved questions about handling and traceability.

There are policies, reference numbers, correspondence records and appeals.

There are also allegations concerning sexualised humiliation, possible intrusion into intimate privacy and the use of professional authority to interfere with a personal relationship.

Those allegations require evidence and fair examination.

They are not established merely because they have been reported.

But they do not become irrelevant because the institution has not communicated a finding.

And that is the point.

An institution cannot demonstrate that its ethical standards work merely by publishing them.
It must show what happens when someone invokes them.

Dear NATO,
I appreciate the policies.
The procedures.
The restrictions.
The reference numbers.

The explanations of why one department is not responsible for what another department may have done.
Very impressive.

But there is one thing I would like you to explain.

Why is it easier to trace the rejection of my data requests than to establish what happened to complaints about the reported sexualised treatment of a woman?

Perhaps the answers are sitting in an office somewhere.
Perhaps an investigation took place.
Perhaps the allegations were referred to another authority.
Perhaps there are entirely legitimate explanations.
Then give me the administrative record.

Because if the allegations are substantiated, and the institution had an opportunity to intervene but failed to do so, the problem is not simply the behaviour of individuals.
It is the system that allowed the behaviour to continue.

And if the allegations are not substantiated, a credible investigation should be capable of explaining why.

Either way, accountability requires more than a beautifully drafted policy.

It requires someone to take responsibility for the decision.

James Bond had a licence to kill.

NATO has a licence to kill complaints.

And if an organisation writes elaborate policies against harassment while knowingly protecting people responsible for sexualised abuse, those policies are not safeguards.

They are a bureaucratic shield for f*** perverts.

That is not a finding about any named officer.

It is the institutional failure that must be investigated and, if the evidence permits, ruled out.
So, NATO, one last question.

Who killed the complaints?

Or are they still alive somewhere, waiting for someone to admit they exist?
Made on
Tilda