invisinble woman
IT IS THE RACE.
I have finally received a Defence to my Equality Act claim. It contains an astonishing admission - it was my race, which was the factor of the famous restriction imposed on me by my own state.
First they identified my race. Then they described it as a risk. Then they gave me a label. And when I asked who had established the facts, everybody pointed to somebody else.
On 2 November 2026, the British Ministry of Defence signed its Defence to my claim under the Equality Act 2010.
Buried in its 41 pages was an extraordinary admission:
“A factor in the decision [...] was the Claimant’s race.”
Race.
Not nationality. Not proven espionage. Not an identified act of misconduct.
Race.
I was born in Leningrad, in the former Soviet Union. I am a British citizen and a Polish citizen.
But somewhere between NATO's Maritime Command, the Spanish military establishment and the British Ministry of Defence, my place of birth became a matter of security significance.
And then the administrative machinery began to move.
1. The administrative machinery of exclusion
There is a profoundly uncomfortable lesson in the history of Nazi Germany.
Its persecution was not carried out solely by fanatics shouting slogans in the streets.
It was also administered through offices, files, procedures, classifications, correspondence and official decisions.
The Nuremberg Laws of 1935 transformed racist ideology into legal distinctions. They established categories of people whose ancestry determined their rights. These people was not relevant to how the state treated them. The same was said in the Defense - my conduct was not supposed to be assessed, my race was sufficient for the Commanding Officer of Northwood HQ to make his decision, which started the whole process of my subsequent criminalisation across Britain spreading into the civil police circle.
In Nazi Germany clerks recorded information. Officials applied rules. Institutions enforced decisions.
Administrative competence was placed at the service of a criminal ideology.
That is not to suggest that the system was perfect. Nor is it to equate a contemporary British discrimination claim with the Holocaust.
The historical scale, ideology, objectives and consequences are fundamentally different.
But there is a question worth asking of any democratic state:
What happens when an institution treats a person's origins as a reason for adverse action while responsibility for verifying the allegation disappears between departments?
Because something remarkably similar has happened to the accountability structure in my own case.
2. The woman who required a security classification
In December 2024, I attended a social event at Northwood Headquarters as the escorted guest of a Spanish naval officer serving at NATO MARCOM.
The British Ministry of Defence now admits that the visit was authorised and that I was issued a red escorted visitor pass.
During the first half of 2025, concerns arose concerning the officer's relationship with me.
Spanish records refer to an alleged security breach and a woman of possible Russian origin.
The Ministry of Defence says that on 19 June 2025 MARCOM informed Northwood security personnel that the officer was under investigation.
The details of that investigation, according to its own Defence, were not disclosed.
What investigation?
Commenced by whom?
Was it still active on 19 June?
What had been verified?
I am still asking.
Nevertheless, the British Commanding Officer suspended the officer's access in June 2025, 7 months after the event.
A separate restriction was then entered against me in the Northwood security visitor management system.
If I attempted to enter, security personnel were to contact the Northwood Police and Security Squadron. And they did as it happened.
This is the administrative elegance of the arrangement.
My access was said to be merely derivative of the officer's access.
But my exclusion was sufficiently individual to require its own operational record.
Derivative when I sought recognition. Individual when the state imposed restrictions.
3. The yellow star and the red sparrow
In Nazi Germany, Jewish people were eventually forced to wear identifying badges, commonly the yellow Star of David.
That was part of a systematic programme of segregation, persecution and genocide.
No equivalent measure was imposed upon me.
But my experience raises a different question about the power of a label.
I did not have a yellow star.
I had a Red Sparrow.
Or, more precisely, I had something that eventually became publicly recognisable under that name.
On 19 September 2026, El Español published an article whose headline described me as a presumed Russian spy and claimed that NATO colleagues called me Gorrión Rojo — Red Sparrow.
The name was finally printed. The article described Spanish officers calling this name a partner of his colleague as people, who were doing nothing wrong. Actually quite the opposite, the context of the article was that she deserved this name, simply because "not even Polish".
Imagine, you bring your new girlfriend to a Christmas party to your workplace. In a month time many of you will do such a thing. Two years later you find out that your colleagues, who have never seen her before, called her MI6 Honey Trap or similar? And you think - my God, these perverts have had wet dreams about her?
What would you do?
Would you make a complaint to your HR? I did complaint - to the MoD, NATO, Spaniards. No answer.
Would you resign from work and walk away? This is what I understand my former partner did. And me too - whilst I have two MARCOM job applications (which disappeared in a thin air anyway), there is no way I will ever work for this bunch of deviants.
Then it comes the persecution.
A Spanish colleague told my former partner in July 2025:
“La gente piensa que esta tía es una espía.”
People think this woman is a spy.
And he has received many messages like that. Months and months of messages from his work colleagues, wife and even children. Messages accusing me of espionage, from people who had nothing to do with any investigation, if such an investigation has even happened.
But as we know from history, people do not need any excuse to put a label on you, if they are encouraged to do so by their superiors?
Review Wye, an official review of my complaint about RAF Police, subsequently recorded that a female officer had been aware of rumours that I was a Russian spy.
The evidence does not establish that the expression Red Sparrow was officially used against me in 2025. That female officer just deny me my rights. She literally said - I do not care if you are British or not, you have no rights here. Of course, I was the wrong race.
The publication of the nickname in September 2026 gave a vivid public identity to a suspicion that had been circulating long before.
It made an allegation memorable.
It made it portable.
And it invited readers to interpret everything that had happened previously through that label.
The danger is retrospective justification: once a woman has been branded a Russian spy, even ordinary events in her past can be made to look like evidence that she always was one.
Her relationship.
Her accent.
Her birthplace.
Her visit to a military social event.
Her interest in target shooting.
Everything becomes suspicious because the label tells the observer what to see.
A rumour does not become evidence merely because it acquires a memorable name.
And a label does not become true merely because it circulates widely.
But the label sticks to the race quite nicely.
4. The national-security threat that Britain says never existed
In November 2025, the Ministry of Defence told the Administrative Court that neither the Commanding Officer nor any other UK decision-maker had ever determined that I was a threat to national security.
Its position was categorical.
Yet a report by Aurelio Ruiz Enebral in El Confidencial Digital, published on 28 October 2026, describes a meeting of Spanish military personnel on 28 June 2025.
According to that report, the Spanish vice-admiral told his officers that my partner had been declared a security risk by British authorities and that I constituted a threat to the national security of the United Kingdom.
The newspaper reports what the senior Spanish officer allegedly communicated. The Ministry of Defence describes what its own decision-makers did or did not determine.
But their accounts raise an obvious question.
Did a British official make a determination that the Ministry now denies? Or was a senior Spanish officer communicating a national-security classification that British authorities had never actually made?
And if it was the latter, what was the source of that classification?
Who authorised its circulation?
Who corrected it?
I have not found the answer.
Perhaps it was never formally recorded.
Perhaps it was misunderstood.
Perhaps it was an inference presented as an established decision.
But an allegation that a British citizen constitutes a national-security threat is too serious to be left floating between two military establishments without an identifiable author.
5. A concern becomes a restriction, and a restriction becomes evidence
The Commanding Officer's letter of 23 June 2025, addressed to Rear Admiral José Enrique Delgado Roig, described Commander Pastor as presenting a security risk because of his relationship.
But it also acknowledged that the underlying information was not fully verified and required further investigation.
Nevertheless, that British restriction subsequently appeared in the Spanish administrative documentation concerning the officer's security clearance.
An allegation had generated an administrative measure.
The administrative measure was then available to another authority as evidence that a serious security concern existed.
This does not prove that the original allegation was false.
But it raises the danger of an evidential circle.
The suspicion justifies the restriction.
The restriction confirms the seriousness of the suspicion.
Another institution relies upon that restriction.
Eventually, nobody can distinguish the original evidence from the administrative consequences it produced.
And somewhere inside that process, a British civilian born in the former Soviet Union acquires a separate security restriction of her own.
The British Ministry of Defence now admits that her race was a factor.
6. From Red Sparrow to suspected criminal
On 26 August 2025, I attended Northwood for an administrative purpose.
I wanted documents and a written explanation. I held a power of attorney authorising me to represent the officer.
That document was not an access pass. It explained my purpose.
The visit became a confrontation with RAF Police.
Hertfordshire Police were called.
Review Wye records that RAF Police told civilian officers that the naval officer and his partner were under investigation.
His partner.
Me.
The information passed to the civilian officers also included concerns about attempts to obtain entry dishonestly and references to the prohibited-place status of the site.
The situation had travelled a remarkable distance.
From an alleged concern relating to a woman's birthplace.
To informal suspicions of espionage.
To a personalised security-system restriction.
To language suggesting that the woman herself had an investigative status.
And finally to the police-facing description of her behaviour in potentially criminal terms.
Yet the Ministry of Defence says that no UK decision-maker determined that I was a national-security threat.
So who investigated me?
What was the status?
What was the suspected offence?
Who authorised the description given to Hertfordshire Police?
And why was information that could not be explained to me nevertheless communicated to another police force?
I have been asking these questions for more than a year.
And here we go - now Hertfordshire Police, when challenged in court, denies that the offence (nobody was ever been able to identify) has taken place. Their regulators, who made such determination based on the information provided by the Police, keep silence at the moment.
Why would they need to apologise to a woman of inferior race?
7. Everybody followed the process
The story contains many institutions.
NATO counterintelligence.
The Spanish military intelligence service, CIFAS.
The Spanish National Security Office.
The British Commanding Officer.
Northwood security personnel.
RAF Police.
Hertfordshire Police.
Each can describe a particular administrative function.
Information was received.
Information was transmitted.
A pass was suspended.
A security record was created.
An instruction was implemented.
Police were contacted.
A complaint was reviewed.
A legal defence was filed.
But identifying the function performed by each institution is not the same as identifying who established the underlying facts.
An instruction explains why someone acted. It does not, by itself, establish that the information behind the instruction was true.
That is the administrative lesson I take from history.
Not that every official applying a rule is a Nazi.
But that the division of responsibility can make it dangerously easy for individuals to act upon classifications whose factual basis nobody has independently established.
8. Who was the architect?
When people look at an administrative system that has produced a disturbing result, they eventually ask a different question.
Not merely who obeyed.
Who shaped the information that everybody else came to rely upon?
The historical analogy invites an even more provocative question: who was the mastermind?
In my case, one senior officer's name appears repeatedly at important points in the documentary chronology.
Rear Admiral José Enrique Delgado Roig.
The Spanish records now available to me show that on 17 March 2025 he met personnel of Spain's CNI in the United Kingdom.
The information reported concerned a Spanish naval officer's relationship with an unidentified woman of possible Russian origin.
The same account indicated that the relationship had ended in January.
In other words, by March, an apparently discontinued personal relationship was nevertheless the subject of discussion involving a senior Spanish naval officer and Spanish intelligence personnel.
I want to understand why. I even reported it to the Police. The only problem is that the Police force, which is supposed to investigate it is... correct, Hertfordshire Constabulary. Imagine Gestapo investigators gathering the evidence for Nuremberg trial and you can imagine why it takes Herts so long to make a decision to proceed with my criminal allegations.
On 16 June 2025, Commander Pastor informed Capt Fernández-Portal that our relationship had resumed and sought advice concerning his changed personal circumstances.
Delgado activated the whole chain immediately.
On 18 June, CIFAS officers flew from Spain and interviewed Pastor at Northwood.
On 19 June 2025 apparently the CO of Northwood, Mr Towers, has made a famous decision to suspend my former partner's pass to the base and for me to become an official outcast to the MoD security systems. And yes, in the Defence, the lawyers clearly stated - he did not need to investigate my conduct, my race was enough for this decision to be taken.
On 22 June 2025, Delgado met Pastor outside Northwood. Did they discuss the security issues? Kind of - my pregnancy. Later the same day, Delgado's friend called Pastor repeatedly trying to convince him not to have kids with me as they would be biologically defective.
Pastor refused to break up with me.
So on 23 June, British Commanding Officer's written notification about the security restriction on Pastor and me was officially sent to Delgado, who activated further chain.
According to the subsequent reporting in El Confidencial Digital, Delgado was the senior Spanish officer who, on 28 June, communicated to Spanish personnel the assertion that I constituted a threat to British national security.
This is a sequence of documented and reported events.
It is not proof that Delgado invented the original allegation, directed an investigation, improperly influenced the British Commanding Officer, or orchestrated everything that followed.
But it gives me a very specific reason to examine his role.
Was he merely receiving and relaying information? Or did he influence the way the information was framed, interpreted and acted upon?
And how did the account he reportedly gave his officers become more categorical than the determination the British Ministry of Defence says it never made?
Those are questions for another article.
An article about one senior officer, the movement of information between intelligence and military institutions, and the distinction between transmitting a concern and shaping the institutional response to it.
Whether any of these events provides grounds for a criminal investigation is a separate question, dependent upon evidence and the applicable law.
But responsibility for the accuracy of information circulated between institutions deserves examination regardless.
9. The race
In its Equality Act Defence, the Ministry of Defence offers a hypothetical comparator.
Another British civilian.
Born in Russia.
In an informal relationship with a foreign military officer.
The officer is supposedly under investigation, with the civilian's birthplace itself a factor in that investigation.
Why must the hypothetical woman also have been born in Russia?
Why is the geographical circumstance whose significance I challenge built into the comparator?
Why does the investigation itself apparently depend upon that same circumstance?
I could have been a Black British woman born in Russia.
A White British woman born in Kenya.
A Polish woman born in the Soviet Union.
Place of birth does not establish citizenship, ethnicity, loyalty or security risk.
Yet the Ministry of Defence has now chosen the language of race to describe a factor in its own decision.
I am entitled to ask exactly what it means.
The British Government may rely upon national security.
It may invoke section 192 of the Equality Act.
The courts will determine the legal consequences.
But a reference to national security does not explain who verified the underlying information, or why a particular woman's origins became an operative factor in an individual restriction.
10. Welcome to Nazi State
My title is deliberately provocative.
The United Kingdom is not Nazi Germany. Yet.
The Red Sparrow label is not equivalent to the yellow star imposed on Jews during the Holocaust. Yet.
And the individuals named in this story are not thereby equated with the leaders or perpetrators of that regime. Yet.
The point of the comparison is to ask what democratic institutions have learned about the dangers of official classification, administrative obedience and responsibility for the treatment of individuals.
I have spent months being told that one institution received information from another.
That a decision was merely precautionary.
That officials were acting within their responsibilities.
That the restriction was simply entered into a system.
That the police were merely responding to an incident.
And that nobody in the British establishment had ever actually determined that I was a national-security threat.
Yet here I am.
A woman individually restricted.
A woman publicly labelled Red Sparrow.
A woman described to civilian police as being under investigation.
A woman whose race, the British Ministry of Defence now admits, was a factor in the decision.
So I have three questions.
Who established the facts?
Who transformed those facts — or allegations — into a security classification?
And who takes responsibility when the classification travels further than the evidence?
History does not allow us to equate every administrative injustice with the crimes of Nazi Germany.
But it certainly gives us reason to examine what happens when institutions stop asking whether the information they are processing is true.
Because a democratic state should never be satisfied with the explanation that everybody was simply doing their job.
It was the race.
Now the question is - who will investigate it?
Who Will Investigate the Investigators?
And now comes the final question: who will investigate the allegations concerning Admiral Delgado and Group Captain Towers?
I asked Hertfordshire Constabulary to reopen its criminal investigation and explain how it could ensure independence when its own handling of information forms part of the matters requiring examination.
I asked the Ministry of Defence Police the same question.
Their response was remarkably efficient. On 23 October 2026, MDP declined to take investigative ownership, explaining that Hertfordshire was already conducting a “current live investigation”.
There was just one problem.
Hertfordshire had closed that investigation in January 2026. Whether it has since been reopened remains unconfirmed.
On 29 October, Hertfordshire's Legal Services acknowledged my demand for clarification and promised that officers would contact me. As of 4 November, I am still waiting for an answer.
I have also referred this institutional accountability problem to my Member of Parliament, Andrew Rosindell, asking for assistance in securing a coordinated decision from both Chief Constables. If necessary, I intend to pursue the question through parliamentary scrutiny.
The background to my request for an independent investigation is already documented.
And so we arrive at the final irony.
When the authorities wanted to restrict me, an investigation somewhere else was apparently enough. When I asked them to investigate allegations against senior officers, nobody could clearly establish who was responsible.
I am not asking anyone to presume guilt.
I am asking who will examine the evidence.
Who will investigate? And who will ensure that the investigation is genuinely independent?
First they identified my race. Then they described it as a risk. Then they gave me a label. And when I asked who had established the facts, everybody pointed to somebody else.
On 2 November 2026, the British Ministry of Defence signed its Defence to my claim under the Equality Act 2010.
Buried in its 41 pages was an extraordinary admission:
“A factor in the decision [...] was the Claimant’s race.”
Race.
Not nationality. Not proven espionage. Not an identified act of misconduct.
Race.
I was born in Leningrad, in the former Soviet Union. I am a British citizen and a Polish citizen.
But somewhere between NATO's Maritime Command, the Spanish military establishment and the British Ministry of Defence, my place of birth became a matter of security significance.
And then the administrative machinery began to move.
1. The administrative machinery of exclusion
There is a profoundly uncomfortable lesson in the history of Nazi Germany.
Its persecution was not carried out solely by fanatics shouting slogans in the streets.
It was also administered through offices, files, procedures, classifications, correspondence and official decisions.
The Nuremberg Laws of 1935 transformed racist ideology into legal distinctions. They established categories of people whose ancestry determined their rights. These people was not relevant to how the state treated them. The same was said in the Defense - my conduct was not supposed to be assessed, my race was sufficient for the Commanding Officer of Northwood HQ to make his decision, which started the whole process of my subsequent criminalisation across Britain spreading into the civil police circle.
In Nazi Germany clerks recorded information. Officials applied rules. Institutions enforced decisions.
Administrative competence was placed at the service of a criminal ideology.
That is not to suggest that the system was perfect. Nor is it to equate a contemporary British discrimination claim with the Holocaust.
The historical scale, ideology, objectives and consequences are fundamentally different.
But there is a question worth asking of any democratic state:
What happens when an institution treats a person's origins as a reason for adverse action while responsibility for verifying the allegation disappears between departments?
Because something remarkably similar has happened to the accountability structure in my own case.
2. The woman who required a security classification
In December 2024, I attended a social event at Northwood Headquarters as the escorted guest of a Spanish naval officer serving at NATO MARCOM.
The British Ministry of Defence now admits that the visit was authorised and that I was issued a red escorted visitor pass.
During the first half of 2025, concerns arose concerning the officer's relationship with me.
Spanish records refer to an alleged security breach and a woman of possible Russian origin.
The Ministry of Defence says that on 19 June 2025 MARCOM informed Northwood security personnel that the officer was under investigation.
The details of that investigation, according to its own Defence, were not disclosed.
What investigation?
Commenced by whom?
Was it still active on 19 June?
What had been verified?
I am still asking.
Nevertheless, the British Commanding Officer suspended the officer's access in June 2025, 7 months after the event.
A separate restriction was then entered against me in the Northwood security visitor management system.
If I attempted to enter, security personnel were to contact the Northwood Police and Security Squadron. And they did as it happened.
This is the administrative elegance of the arrangement.
My access was said to be merely derivative of the officer's access.
But my exclusion was sufficiently individual to require its own operational record.
Derivative when I sought recognition. Individual when the state imposed restrictions.
3. The yellow star and the red sparrow
In Nazi Germany, Jewish people were eventually forced to wear identifying badges, commonly the yellow Star of David.
That was part of a systematic programme of segregation, persecution and genocide.
No equivalent measure was imposed upon me.
But my experience raises a different question about the power of a label.
I did not have a yellow star.
I had a Red Sparrow.
Or, more precisely, I had something that eventually became publicly recognisable under that name.
On 19 September 2026, El Español published an article whose headline described me as a presumed Russian spy and claimed that NATO colleagues called me Gorrión Rojo — Red Sparrow.
The name was finally printed. The article described Spanish officers calling this name a partner of his colleague as people, who were doing nothing wrong. Actually quite the opposite, the context of the article was that she deserved this name, simply because "not even Polish".
Imagine, you bring your new girlfriend to a Christmas party to your workplace. In a month time many of you will do such a thing. Two years later you find out that your colleagues, who have never seen her before, called her MI6 Honey Trap or similar? And you think - my God, these perverts have had wet dreams about her?
What would you do?
Would you make a complaint to your HR? I did complaint - to the MoD, NATO, Spaniards. No answer.
Would you resign from work and walk away? This is what I understand my former partner did. And me too - whilst I have two MARCOM job applications (which disappeared in a thin air anyway), there is no way I will ever work for this bunch of deviants.
Then it comes the persecution.
A Spanish colleague told my former partner in July 2025:
“La gente piensa que esta tía es una espía.”
People think this woman is a spy.
And he has received many messages like that. Months and months of messages from his work colleagues, wife and even children. Messages accusing me of espionage, from people who had nothing to do with any investigation, if such an investigation has even happened.
But as we know from history, people do not need any excuse to put a label on you, if they are encouraged to do so by their superiors?
Review Wye, an official review of my complaint about RAF Police, subsequently recorded that a female officer had been aware of rumours that I was a Russian spy.
The evidence does not establish that the expression Red Sparrow was officially used against me in 2025. That female officer just deny me my rights. She literally said - I do not care if you are British or not, you have no rights here. Of course, I was the wrong race.
The publication of the nickname in September 2026 gave a vivid public identity to a suspicion that had been circulating long before.
It made an allegation memorable.
It made it portable.
And it invited readers to interpret everything that had happened previously through that label.
The danger is retrospective justification: once a woman has been branded a Russian spy, even ordinary events in her past can be made to look like evidence that she always was one.
Her relationship.
Her accent.
Her birthplace.
Her visit to a military social event.
Her interest in target shooting.
Everything becomes suspicious because the label tells the observer what to see.
A rumour does not become evidence merely because it acquires a memorable name.
And a label does not become true merely because it circulates widely.
But the label sticks to the race quite nicely.
4. The national-security threat that Britain says never existed
In November 2025, the Ministry of Defence told the Administrative Court that neither the Commanding Officer nor any other UK decision-maker had ever determined that I was a threat to national security.
Its position was categorical.
Yet a report by Aurelio Ruiz Enebral in El Confidencial Digital, published on 28 October 2026, describes a meeting of Spanish military personnel on 28 June 2025.
According to that report, the Spanish vice-admiral told his officers that my partner had been declared a security risk by British authorities and that I constituted a threat to the national security of the United Kingdom.
The newspaper reports what the senior Spanish officer allegedly communicated. The Ministry of Defence describes what its own decision-makers did or did not determine.
But their accounts raise an obvious question.
Did a British official make a determination that the Ministry now denies? Or was a senior Spanish officer communicating a national-security classification that British authorities had never actually made?
And if it was the latter, what was the source of that classification?
Who authorised its circulation?
Who corrected it?
I have not found the answer.
Perhaps it was never formally recorded.
Perhaps it was misunderstood.
Perhaps it was an inference presented as an established decision.
But an allegation that a British citizen constitutes a national-security threat is too serious to be left floating between two military establishments without an identifiable author.
5. A concern becomes a restriction, and a restriction becomes evidence
The Commanding Officer's letter of 23 June 2025, addressed to Rear Admiral José Enrique Delgado Roig, described Commander Pastor as presenting a security risk because of his relationship.
But it also acknowledged that the underlying information was not fully verified and required further investigation.
Nevertheless, that British restriction subsequently appeared in the Spanish administrative documentation concerning the officer's security clearance.
An allegation had generated an administrative measure.
The administrative measure was then available to another authority as evidence that a serious security concern existed.
This does not prove that the original allegation was false.
But it raises the danger of an evidential circle.
The suspicion justifies the restriction.
The restriction confirms the seriousness of the suspicion.
Another institution relies upon that restriction.
Eventually, nobody can distinguish the original evidence from the administrative consequences it produced.
And somewhere inside that process, a British civilian born in the former Soviet Union acquires a separate security restriction of her own.
The British Ministry of Defence now admits that her race was a factor.
6. From Red Sparrow to suspected criminal
On 26 August 2025, I attended Northwood for an administrative purpose.
I wanted documents and a written explanation. I held a power of attorney authorising me to represent the officer.
That document was not an access pass. It explained my purpose.
The visit became a confrontation with RAF Police.
Hertfordshire Police were called.
Review Wye records that RAF Police told civilian officers that the naval officer and his partner were under investigation.
His partner.
Me.
The information passed to the civilian officers also included concerns about attempts to obtain entry dishonestly and references to the prohibited-place status of the site.
The situation had travelled a remarkable distance.
From an alleged concern relating to a woman's birthplace.
To informal suspicions of espionage.
To a personalised security-system restriction.
To language suggesting that the woman herself had an investigative status.
And finally to the police-facing description of her behaviour in potentially criminal terms.
Yet the Ministry of Defence says that no UK decision-maker determined that I was a national-security threat.
So who investigated me?
What was the status?
What was the suspected offence?
Who authorised the description given to Hertfordshire Police?
And why was information that could not be explained to me nevertheless communicated to another police force?
I have been asking these questions for more than a year.
And here we go - now Hertfordshire Police, when challenged in court, denies that the offence (nobody was ever been able to identify) has taken place. Their regulators, who made such determination based on the information provided by the Police, keep silence at the moment.
Why would they need to apologise to a woman of inferior race?
7. Everybody followed the process
The story contains many institutions.
NATO counterintelligence.
The Spanish military intelligence service, CIFAS.
The Spanish National Security Office.
The British Commanding Officer.
Northwood security personnel.
RAF Police.
Hertfordshire Police.
Each can describe a particular administrative function.
Information was received.
Information was transmitted.
A pass was suspended.
A security record was created.
An instruction was implemented.
Police were contacted.
A complaint was reviewed.
A legal defence was filed.
But identifying the function performed by each institution is not the same as identifying who established the underlying facts.
An instruction explains why someone acted. It does not, by itself, establish that the information behind the instruction was true.
That is the administrative lesson I take from history.
Not that every official applying a rule is a Nazi.
But that the division of responsibility can make it dangerously easy for individuals to act upon classifications whose factual basis nobody has independently established.
8. Who was the architect?
When people look at an administrative system that has produced a disturbing result, they eventually ask a different question.
Not merely who obeyed.
Who shaped the information that everybody else came to rely upon?
The historical analogy invites an even more provocative question: who was the mastermind?
In my case, one senior officer's name appears repeatedly at important points in the documentary chronology.
Rear Admiral José Enrique Delgado Roig.
The Spanish records now available to me show that on 17 March 2025 he met personnel of Spain's CNI in the United Kingdom.
The information reported concerned a Spanish naval officer's relationship with an unidentified woman of possible Russian origin.
The same account indicated that the relationship had ended in January.
In other words, by March, an apparently discontinued personal relationship was nevertheless the subject of discussion involving a senior Spanish naval officer and Spanish intelligence personnel.
I want to understand why. I even reported it to the Police. The only problem is that the Police force, which is supposed to investigate it is... correct, Hertfordshire Constabulary. Imagine Gestapo investigators gathering the evidence for Nuremberg trial and you can imagine why it takes Herts so long to make a decision to proceed with my criminal allegations.
On 16 June 2025, Commander Pastor informed Capt Fernández-Portal that our relationship had resumed and sought advice concerning his changed personal circumstances.
Delgado activated the whole chain immediately.
On 18 June, CIFAS officers flew from Spain and interviewed Pastor at Northwood.
On 19 June 2025 apparently the CO of Northwood, Mr Towers, has made a famous decision to suspend my former partner's pass to the base and for me to become an official outcast to the MoD security systems. And yes, in the Defence, the lawyers clearly stated - he did not need to investigate my conduct, my race was enough for this decision to be taken.
On 22 June 2025, Delgado met Pastor outside Northwood. Did they discuss the security issues? Kind of - my pregnancy. Later the same day, Delgado's friend called Pastor repeatedly trying to convince him not to have kids with me as they would be biologically defective.
Pastor refused to break up with me.
So on 23 June, British Commanding Officer's written notification about the security restriction on Pastor and me was officially sent to Delgado, who activated further chain.
According to the subsequent reporting in El Confidencial Digital, Delgado was the senior Spanish officer who, on 28 June, communicated to Spanish personnel the assertion that I constituted a threat to British national security.
This is a sequence of documented and reported events.
It is not proof that Delgado invented the original allegation, directed an investigation, improperly influenced the British Commanding Officer, or orchestrated everything that followed.
But it gives me a very specific reason to examine his role.
Was he merely receiving and relaying information? Or did he influence the way the information was framed, interpreted and acted upon?
And how did the account he reportedly gave his officers become more categorical than the determination the British Ministry of Defence says it never made?
Those are questions for another article.
An article about one senior officer, the movement of information between intelligence and military institutions, and the distinction between transmitting a concern and shaping the institutional response to it.
Whether any of these events provides grounds for a criminal investigation is a separate question, dependent upon evidence and the applicable law.
But responsibility for the accuracy of information circulated between institutions deserves examination regardless.
9. The race
In its Equality Act Defence, the Ministry of Defence offers a hypothetical comparator.
Another British civilian.
Born in Russia.
In an informal relationship with a foreign military officer.
The officer is supposedly under investigation, with the civilian's birthplace itself a factor in that investigation.
Why must the hypothetical woman also have been born in Russia?
Why is the geographical circumstance whose significance I challenge built into the comparator?
Why does the investigation itself apparently depend upon that same circumstance?
I could have been a Black British woman born in Russia.
A White British woman born in Kenya.
A Polish woman born in the Soviet Union.
Place of birth does not establish citizenship, ethnicity, loyalty or security risk.
Yet the Ministry of Defence has now chosen the language of race to describe a factor in its own decision.
I am entitled to ask exactly what it means.
The British Government may rely upon national security.
It may invoke section 192 of the Equality Act.
The courts will determine the legal consequences.
But a reference to national security does not explain who verified the underlying information, or why a particular woman's origins became an operative factor in an individual restriction.
10. Welcome to Nazi State
My title is deliberately provocative.
The United Kingdom is not Nazi Germany. Yet.
The Red Sparrow label is not equivalent to the yellow star imposed on Jews during the Holocaust. Yet.
And the individuals named in this story are not thereby equated with the leaders or perpetrators of that regime. Yet.
The point of the comparison is to ask what democratic institutions have learned about the dangers of official classification, administrative obedience and responsibility for the treatment of individuals.
I have spent months being told that one institution received information from another.
That a decision was merely precautionary.
That officials were acting within their responsibilities.
That the restriction was simply entered into a system.
That the police were merely responding to an incident.
And that nobody in the British establishment had ever actually determined that I was a national-security threat.
Yet here I am.
A woman individually restricted.
A woman publicly labelled Red Sparrow.
A woman described to civilian police as being under investigation.
A woman whose race, the British Ministry of Defence now admits, was a factor in the decision.
So I have three questions.
Who established the facts?
Who transformed those facts — or allegations — into a security classification?
And who takes responsibility when the classification travels further than the evidence?
History does not allow us to equate every administrative injustice with the crimes of Nazi Germany.
But it certainly gives us reason to examine what happens when institutions stop asking whether the information they are processing is true.
Because a democratic state should never be satisfied with the explanation that everybody was simply doing their job.
It was the race.
Now the question is - who will investigate it?
Who Will Investigate the Investigators?
And now comes the final question: who will investigate the allegations concerning Admiral Delgado and Group Captain Towers?
I asked Hertfordshire Constabulary to reopen its criminal investigation and explain how it could ensure independence when its own handling of information forms part of the matters requiring examination.
I asked the Ministry of Defence Police the same question.
Their response was remarkably efficient. On 23 October 2026, MDP declined to take investigative ownership, explaining that Hertfordshire was already conducting a “current live investigation”.
There was just one problem.
Hertfordshire had closed that investigation in January 2026. Whether it has since been reopened remains unconfirmed.
On 29 October, Hertfordshire's Legal Services acknowledged my demand for clarification and promised that officers would contact me. As of 4 November, I am still waiting for an answer.
I have also referred this institutional accountability problem to my Member of Parliament, Andrew Rosindell, asking for assistance in securing a coordinated decision from both Chief Constables. If necessary, I intend to pursue the question through parliamentary scrutiny.
The background to my request for an independent investigation is already documented.
And so we arrive at the final irony.
When the authorities wanted to restrict me, an investigation somewhere else was apparently enough. When I asked them to investigate allegations against senior officers, nobody could clearly establish who was responsible.
I am not asking anyone to presume guilt.
I am asking who will examine the evidence.
Who will investigate? And who will ensure that the investigation is genuinely independent?
